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This thesis consists of two empirically oriented papers on Central Bank
Independence (CBI) Reforms.
Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have
chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing
their ability to control the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries,
of which 89 had implemented CBI reforms during 1980-2005, was collected.
Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to
independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high
variability in in￿ ation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced.
No such e⁄ects were found for OECD countries.
Paper [2], using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach, studies whether CBI
reform matters for in￿ ation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset
including the possible occurence of CBI reforms in 132 countries during the
period 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing
down in￿ ation in high-in￿ ation countries, but it seems unrelated to in￿ ation
performance in low-in￿ ation countries.
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Mats Landstr￿mThis thesis consists of this summary and the following two papers:
[1] Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?
(co-authored with Sven-Olov Daunfeldt and J￿rgen Hellstr￿m)
[2] Do Central Bank Independence Reforms Matter for In￿ ation Perfor-
mance?Summary
1 Introduction
Monetary policy theories concern the e⁄ects of monetary instruments on
the growth and stability of macroeconomic variables. Recent theories on
central banking, however, are also concerned with the institutional structure
of the policy-making authority and how it a⁄ects the macroeconomy. An
important trend in international economic politics during recent decades
is the increase in central bank independence (CBI). Cukierman (2008, p.
723), for example, notes that ￿most central banks in today￿ s world enjoy
substantially higher levels of both legal and actual independence than twenty
years ago or earlier￿ . At the same time there has emerged a large theoretical
and empirical literature concerning CBI.
This thesis consists of two self-contained empirically oriented papers on
CBI reform. Paper [1] tests empirically why politicians have chosen to dele-
gate authority to central banks. Paper [2], using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence ap-
proach, investigates whether CBI reform matters for in￿ ation performance.
The rest of this summary consists of an overview of the issues presented
in the thesis. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background of the world-
wide introduction of CBI reform. Section 3 presents the previous empirical
research concerning the implications of CBI. Finally, Section 4 summarizes
the two papers.
2 Theoretical Background
With few exceptions, countries all over the world have seen a remarkable
improvement in in￿ ation during the last three decades. This improvement
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is seen in the recent lower prevalence both of hyperin￿ ation in less developed
countries, and of high in￿ ation in the OECD countries, where double-digit
in￿ ation was not unusual three decades ago. How can this improvement be
explained?
The relation between in￿ ation and employment has always been of in-
terest to macroeconomists. In a classic study using historical data from
the UK, Phillips (1958) found a stable trade-o⁄ between wage changes and
unemployment. Samuelson and Solow (1960) presented this trade-o⁄ as a
menu for policymakers, suggesting that they could exploit it to lower unem-
ployment at the expense of higher in￿ ation.
However, there has emerged a consensus among macroeconomists, among
other things due to pioneering work by Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968),
that the only goal that policymakers can successfully achieve with monetary
policy in the long run is price stability. This is because in the long run the
equilibrium unemployment rate, or natural rate, determines actual unem-
ployment. In the short run, however, monetary policy is non-neutral, due
to nominal rigidities (Gal￿ 2008), and therefore there is a short run choice
between targeting in￿ ation and targeting unemployment. But, if the unem-
ployment target of the policymakers is too ambitious, i.e. lower than the
natural rate, so that the target for output is higher than its natural rate,
then there will be an in￿ ationary bias, a higher in￿ ation in equilibrium than
the in￿ ation target, due to time-inconsistency of optimal monetary policy
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977).1 If a central bank has a credible commitment
1It has been noted (Bo￿nger, 2001) that the ￿rst-best solution for policymakers to
achieve an unemployment close to the target would be the removal of microeconomic
distortions in the labor market. This issue is not investigated in this thesis.
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to low in￿ ation, it will be achieved at no cost. However, the mere announce-
ment of a low-in￿ ation goal is usually not enough to achieve credibility, if
the public has reason to expect future expansionary monetary policy. If the
public expected contractionary monetary policy, and hence lower in￿ ation,
and was expected to act on that belief, then monetary policymakers would
have an incentive for expansionary monetary policy. A rational public will
foresee this possibility and negotiate contracts under the expectation that
monetary policy will in fact be expansionary.
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) argued that the solution to this problem
was to subject monetary policymakers to a strict low-in￿ ation rule. But, of
course, for this solution to work, following the rule must also be credible,
and this is not the case if pure reputational forces are weak. Therefore,
researchers have focused on designing institutional arrangements to make a
low-in￿ ation rule credible. This has usually meant some removal of monetary
policymaking authority from elected politicians. Rogo⁄￿ s (1985) solution
involved the delegation of monetary policymaking to a conservative central
banker, that is, one that would put a lower weight on the loss associated with
unemployment than would society at large, resulting in lower in￿ ation in
equilibrium. Conservative might also mean taking a longer view, discounting
the future less in a repeated policy-game context (Cukierman, 1992; Bo￿nger
2001). This might mean removing decisions about monetary policy from
short-term policy pressures.2
2There has also been research on performance contracts, beginning with Persson and
Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995), concerned with subjecting central bankers to incen-
tives so as to achieve optimal monetary policy and thus remove in￿ ation bias, but this is
perepheral to the issues discussed here.
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One such institutional design is for politicians to delegate monetary pol-
icy to an independent central bank, thus removing decisions about monetary
policy from short term policy pressures. Giving more independence to a cen-
tral bank can thus be seen as a commitment device for the government.
However, this can be questioned on various grounds. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that time-inconsistency is not solved by CBI reform,
but only relocated (McCallum, 1997), because politicians can always revoke
their delegation of monetary policy. Thus, to solve the time-inconsistency
problem, the costs of revocation must be high enough to make the delegation
credible.
It has also been argued that low in￿ ation does not depend on CBI.
It might rather be that CBI and a commitment to low in￿ ation are both
determined by social attitudes. A statistical correlation between CBI and
in￿ ation then says nothing about causality (Forder 1996; Hayo, 1998). Thus,
Blinder (1998, p. 41) claims that lower in￿ ation ￿came from determined, but
discretionary, application of tight money. Rather than seeking short-term
gains, central banks paid the price to disin￿ate. As in the Nike commercial,
they just did it￿ .
In any case it is something of a puzzle that politicians choose to give
up control over monetary policy when they know that, at least in the short
run, it can in￿ uence unemployment and output levels. It is particularly sur-
prising from a public choice perspective, since if it is possible to manipulate
macroeconomic variables before an election, we would expect opportunistic
politicians to do so. While not overwhelming, there seems to be some empir-
ical evidence of this (Mueller, 2003, p. 446-7). Mueller argues that ￿central
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bankers do not appear to be totally oblivious to the electoral fortunes of their
governments￿ .
In any case, theoretical explanations for why politicians may implement
CBI reforms include: to reduce high and persistent in￿ ation (Rogo⁄, 1985);
to maintain price stability where it has already been achieved (Cukierman,
1994); to counteract high government debt (Max￿eld, 1997). It may also
occur: where the political system is highly competitive (Cukierman, 1994);
where the ￿nancial sector is relatively in￿ uential (Posen, 1993); and there
are more possibilities (Eij¢ nger and de Haan, 1996, ch. 5). However, why
politicians have delegated authority to central banks has never been tested
empirically.
3 Previous Empirical Research
Cukierman (2008) surveys empirical evidence that countries with indepen-
dent central banks have lower in￿ ation, usually derived using an index of
degree of legal central bank independence (CBI). Cukierman (1992), Alesina
and Summers (1993), and Grilli et al.(1991) found a negative correlation be-
tween average in￿ ation and the degree of legal central bank independence,
in cross-country regressions of industrial countries, suggesting that in￿ ation
might be brought down by CBI reform. On the other hand, for a group
of less-developed countries, no relation was found (Cukierman et al., 1993).
However, when other proxies for CBI were used, such as the actual turnover
rate of central bank governors, a negative correlation was found between
independence and in￿ ation in these less-developed countries as well.
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More recently there have been numerous studies questioning these earlier
results for various reasons. First, the validity of CBI indices is problematic,
because researchers using them must choose which aspects of independence
to include, and what weights to give to them. So, the indices di⁄er a lot
when it comes to ranking countries. Forder (1996, 1998) showed that the
indices of CBI used were not robust, because small changes in them resulted
in no correlation between CBI and in￿ ation. The question of causality has
also been raised, because statistical correlation says nothing about whether
the level of CBI determines in￿ ation, or whether causality might run in the
other direction.
There have also been a few empirical studies which found that the degree
of CBI did not determine in￿ ation. For example, Hayo (1998) found that
public attitudes determined a low-in￿ ation culture, with the formal design of
central bank institutions being only one aspect. Posen (1995) argues for the
importance of societal support for CBI, and identi￿es in particular ￿nancial
sector support for CBI as important for the achievement of price stability.
A study by Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) of implementation dates of
CBI-reforms in OECD countries shows that price stability was actually
achieved prior of CBI reforms in most countries. Stabilization of in￿ ation
also preceded CBI reform in some Latin American countries (JÆcome and
Vasquez, 2008). Furthermore, the probability that a central bank gover-
nor would be replaced was positively related to in￿ ation (Dreher et al.,
2008), perhaps suggesting that causality ran from in￿ ation to turnover.
Campillo and Miron (1997) found evidence suggesting that formal insti-
tutional arrangements, such as CBI, also may be relatively unimportant
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compared to less formal ones such as openness.
4 Summary of the Papers
4.1 Paper [1]: Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank
Independence Reforms?
Over the two last decades many countries, including New Zealand, Lesotho,
England, Kazakhstan, Sweden and Chile, have implemented institutional
reforms which granted their central banks more independence from the po-
litical process. It is something of a puzzle, however, that politicians have
chosen to give up control over monetary policy when they knew that at least
in the short run it could in￿ uence employment and production levels.
There are many possible theoretical explanations. It has been suggested,
for example, that central bank independence (CBI) reforms occur in coun-
tries with high and persistent in￿ ation (Rogo⁄, 1985); where price stability
has already been achieved (Cukierman, 1994); where government debt is
relatively high (Max￿eld, 1997); where the political system is highly com-
petitive (Cukierman, 1994); where the ￿nancial sector is relatively in￿ uential
(Posen, 1993); and there are more possibilities (reviewed by Eij¢ nger and
de Haan, 1996; ch. 5).
However, why politicians choose to delegate authority to central banks
has (so far as we know) never been tested empirically. Previous empirical
studies (de Haan and Van￿ t Hag, 1995; Cukierman and Webb, 1995; de Haan
and Siermann, 1996; Bagherei and Habib, 1998) used various CBI indices to
investigate instead what determined a given level of independence (i.e., not
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a change). These studies could thus only explain cross-country di⁄erences,
while the more interesting question, why politicians choose to implement
CBI reform, remains unanswered.
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of CBI reform us-
ing a new dataset covering its possible occurrence in 132 countries, of which
89 had implemented such a reform during 1980-2005. Thus, the literature
on the time-inconsistency of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977;
Barro and Gordon, 1983a, b), and Rogo⁄￿ s (1985) suggestion that politi-
cians should delegate power to a more in￿ ation-averse central bank, seem to
have been very in￿ uential.
It was found in this study that non-OECD countries with a history of
high variability in in￿ ation were more likely to implement CBI reform, sug-
gesting that politicians in those countries had become strongly averse to
in￿ ation and therefore implemented CBI reform to establish credibility for
a price-stability rule. In addition, the likelihood of CBI reform seems to
have increased when politicians in non-OECD countries faced a high prob-
ability of being replaced. No such e⁄ects were found for OECD countries,
where politicians may not have felt a need to tie the hands of incoming gov-
ernments, or that the credibility of a low-in￿ ation goal could be achieved
by other means. Finally, countries that were members of an economic co-
operation organization (such as the EU) seem to have been more likely to
implement CBI reform if other countries in the organization had recently
done so.
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4.2 Paper [2]: Do Central Bank Independence Reforms Mat-
ter for In￿ ation Performance?
The purpose of this paper is to study, using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence ap-
proach, whether countries that implemented CBI reforms during the study
period performed better in terms of in￿ ation than those countries that did
not. Legal changes considered CBI reform are those that formally decreased
the in￿ uence of politicians on monetary policy. The analysis is based on
a dataset compiled for the ￿rst paper in the thesis, covering the possible
occurence of CBI reform in 132 countries during 1980-2005, more countries
than in any previous study on CBI and in￿ ation performance. Countries
that implemented CBI reform are compared to those that did not.
The paper addresses problems in earlier empirical studies on CBI and
in￿ ation, regarding the scarcity of data, possible endogeniety, and subjec-
tivity. As in the previous paper, focus is on possible changes in the legal
independence of central banks, not on its level. As the reforms increased
CBI by de￿nition, the subjectivity that plagues the most commonly-used
indices of CBI (see also Daunfeldt and de Luna, 2008) is reduced.
In accordance with Ball and Sheridan (2005), the statistical phenomenon
of regression to the mean is controlled for. This is done by including in￿ ation
during the ￿rst year in the dataset as an explanatory variable. Also, to
study whether the e¢ ciency of CBI reform depends on previous in￿ ation,
countries are included or excluded from regressions, depending on its level
in the pre-reform period. The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach responds
to possible endogeneity connected to unobservable time-invariant country-
9Summary
speci￿c e⁄ects on the level of in￿ ation. That is, since di⁄erences are used,
these e⁄ects are cancelled out.
It is found that countries that implemented CBI reform reduced in￿ a-
tion more than countries that did not. No such e⁄ect, however, is found
for countries with previously low in￿ ation. On the contrary, for some of
those countries CBI reform seems to be associated with higher post-reform
in￿ ation. The overall results thus seem to be driven by countries with high
pre-reform in￿ ation, perhaps suggesting that the e¢ ciency of CBI reform is
related to recent experience with in￿ ation.
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Abstract
This paper is a ￿rst empirical attempt to investigate why politicians
around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central
banks, thereby reducing their ability to ￿ne-tune the economy. A new
data-set covering 132 countries, of which 89 countries had implemented
such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were
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1 Introduction
Over the two last decades many countries, including New Zealand, Lesotho,
England, Kazakhstan, Sweden and Chile, have implemented institutional
reforms which granted their central banks more independence from the po-
litical process. It is something of a puzzle, however, that politicians choose
to give up control over monetary policy when they knew that (at least in
the short run) it can in￿ uence employment and production levels.
There are many possible theoretical explanations. It has been suggested,
for example, that central bank independence (CBI) reforms occur in coun-
tries with high and persistent in￿ ation (Rogo⁄, 1985); where price stability
has already been achieved (Cukierman, 1994); where government debt is
relatively high (Max￿eld, 1997); where the political system is highly com-
petitive (Cukierman, 1994); where the ￿nancial sector is relatively in￿ uential
(Posen, 1993); and there are more possibilities (Eij¢ nger and de Haan, 1996;
ch. 5, provides an overview).
However, the question why political politicians choose to delegate author-
ity to central banks has (as far as we know) never been tested empirically.
Previous empirical studies (de Haan and Van￿ t Hag, 1995; Cukierman and
Webb, 1995; de Haan and Siermann, 1996; Bagherei and Habib, 1998) in-
stead used various CBI-indices to investigate what determined a given level
(i.e., not a change) of independence. These studies can thus only explain
cross-country di⁄erences, while the more interesting question, why politi-
cians choose to implement CBI-reforms, remains unanswered.
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of CBI-reform
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using a new data set that covers its possible occurrence in 132 countries, of
which 89 had implemented such a reform during 1980-2005. Thus, the liter-
ature on the time-inconsistency of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott,
1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983), together with Rogo⁄￿ s (1985) suggestion
that politicians should delegate power to a more in￿ ation-averse central
bank, seem to have been very in￿ uential.
It was found in this study that non-OECD countries with a history of
high variability in in￿ ation were more likely to implement CBI-reforms, sug-
gesting that politicians in those countries have received a strong aversion to
in￿ ation and therefore implement CBI-reforms to establish credibility for a
price stability rule. In addition, the likelihood of a CBI-reform seems to
have increased when politicians in non-OECD countries faced a high prob-
ability of being replaced. No such e⁄ects were found for OECD-countries,
implying that politicians in more industrialized countries do not feel a need
to tie the hands of incoming governments and that the credibility of a low
in￿ ation goal can be achieved with other means. Finally, countries that
were members of an economic cooperation organization seem to have been
more likely to implement CBI-reforms if other countries in the organization
recently had recently done so.
In the next section, possible determinants of CBI-reform are discussed.
The data used are described in Section 3. Section 4 then describes the econo-
metric speci￿cation, while the results are presented in Section 5. Finally,
section 6 summarizes and draws conclusions.
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2 Determinants of central bank independence re-
forms
It is commonly believed that CBI-reforms will reduce the in￿ ationary bias
of policy and make a low in￿ ation rule credible. Kydland and Prescott￿ s
(1977) and Barro and Gordon￿ s (1983) work on time inconsistency in mone-
tary policy, together with Rogo⁄￿ s (1985) suggestion that a more in￿ ation-
averse central bank can make a low in￿ ation policy credible, constitute the
theoretical rationale for this belief.
Empirical studies have also found a negative correlation between an index
re￿ ecting the degree of CBI and average in￿ ation (e.g., Alesina, 1988; Grilli
et al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Jonsson,
1995; and Eij¢ nger et al., 1998). Alesina and Summers (1993) could also
not ￿nd any correlation between CBI and unemployment, real economic
growth, or real interest rates. As a result, there is a broad consensus that
CBI improves the likelihood of achieving low in￿ ation at no real economic
cost.
According to the time-inconsistency theory, achievement of price stabil-
ity cannot be explained by a commitment to central bank autonomy. If
announcement of a CBI-reform were su¢ cient for achieving low in￿ ation,
then it would be optimal for politicians to violate the commitment once
price stability was achieved (McCallum, 1997). Thus, time-inconsistency
theory suggest that irreversible CBI-reforms (or reversible only with great
di¢ culty) are implemented because politicians want to achieve low and sta-
ble in￿ ation.
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On the other hand, Cukierman (1994) suggested that CBI-reforms might
be implemented to maintain low in￿ ation, i.e., as a commitment against
future incautious politicians. This implies that politicians implement CBI-
reforms only when they have already achieved low in￿ ation. And in fact, by
comparing the implementation dates of CBI-reforms with long-term in￿ ation
trends for 29 OECD-countries, Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) found that
price stability had been achieved in most countries before their central banks
became more independent.
According to the time-inconsistency model of monetary policy, the ben-
e￿t of surprise in￿ ation is directly related to the gap between politicians
desired unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment. Thus
CBI-reform would be more valuable when the natural rate of unemploy-
ment is high (Cukeriman, 1994; Eij¢ nger and Schaling, 1995).
It has been suggested, moreover, that CBI-reforms have been imple-
mented, especially in less-developed countries, to signal creditworthiness
to foreign investors (Max￿eld, 1997). Many less-developed countries have
problems with high debt-ratios. Delegation of monetary policy to an inde-
pendent central bank may then signal creditworthiness. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) can also demand more CBI as a prerequisite for ob-
taining funds. Max￿eld (1997) presents some descriptive results indicating
that CBI-reforms have in fact been implemented in developing countries to
signal creditworthiness.
Political factors may also in￿ uence the decision to delegate power to inde-
pendent central banks. According to Cukierman (1994), politically instable
countries are less likely to implement CBI-reforms. When irregular changes
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of government due to revolution, coup d·etat, etc, occur often, politicians
are mainly concerned with their own survival. On the other hand, when they
fear that they might lose power in the next election, CBI-reforms might be
implemented to limit the power of the incoming government. In addition,
Moser (1994) presented some evidence that central banks in countries with
extensive checks and balances were more independent.
Posen (1993) argued that the observed negative correlation between CBI-
indices and in￿ ation was not causal, because both were determined by ￿-
nancial opposition to in￿ ation, suggesting that CBI-reforms had been im-
plemented in countries where the ￿nancial sector was more in￿ uential. Sim-
ilarly, CBI-reforms are more likely in countries where public opposition to
in￿ ation is strong. Posen (1993), Forder (1996), and Hayo (1998) have all
argued that CBI and commitment to low in￿ ation are jointly determined by
social attitudes, i.e., that CBI is endogenous. This suggests that politicians
in countries characterized by a high variability in historical in￿ ation might
have created a strong aversion against in￿ ation (Hayo, 1998) and there-
fore implemented institutional reforms that delegates power to independent
central bankers. Thus, independent central banks are successful in imple-
menting low and stable in￿ ation merely because their independence re￿ ects
a social attitude that supports low in￿ ation.
3 Data
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is a qualitative variable in-
dicating whether a CBI-reform was implemented in a particular year. How-
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ever, implementation years of CBI-reforms are not readily available any-
where. Therefore, to obtain the dates, all (162) central banks listed in Mor-
gan Stanley￿ s Central Bank Directory 2004 were asked by e-mail: (i) Has
your country implemented any institutional reforms that grant your central
bank more independence from elected policymakers? (ii) If yes, when? (iii)
Where can we ￿nd more information about this?
Our study focused on a change towards more CBI, without regard to
the magnitude of the reform. We consider all legal reforms that reduced the
in￿ uence of politicians on monetary policy making as CBI-reforms, whereas
a mere statement that price stability is the only goal of monetary policy
was not regarded as su¢ cient. We included legal reforms that safe-guard
the low in￿ ation goal in the legislation; reduce the possibility for government
to override central bank decisions on operating targets; reduce governments
opportunities to use central bank credits to ￿nance budget de￿cits; reduce
the possibility of dismissing central bank governors or increasing their term
in o¢ ce or their numbers; and so on.
95 central banks (59%) ￿nally answered the questionnaire. In a formal
analysis of the response rate (with a simple probit model), the probability
of response is increased in GDP and was lower for Asian, South American
and African countries compared to Australian, European, and North Amer-
ican countries (statistically signi￿cant results at conventional levels). The
country￿ s in￿ ation rate did not seem to a⁄ect the probability of response.1
Other sources (e.g., central bank publications, legislative acts, and sci-
1The analysis was hampered by lack of data, especially for the countries that did not
respond to the e-mail questionnaire.
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enti￿c articles) were used to validate the e-mail answers and to obtain the
dates of CBI-reforms for countries that did not respond. The ￿nal sample
consists of 132 countries (81% of those initially contacted), of which 89 had
implemented CBI-reforms. Table A1 (in the Appendix) lists the countries
for which information on CBI-reforms is still missing; whereas Table A2 (in
the Appendix) lists the dates when CBI-reforms occurred and sources that
were used to verify them.
Figure 1 shows the time trend of adoption of CBI-reforms around the
world during 1980-2005. New Zealand is often considered the ￿rst country to
implement CBI-reform with its 1989 Reserve Bank Act, which substantially
reduced politicians ability to produce surprise in￿ ation.2 New Zealand was
soon followed by Belize, El Salvador, Hungary and Uganda in 1991. The
























Figure 1: Number of central bank independence reforms for the full sample.
2Evans et al. (1996), Silverstone et al. (1996), and Daunfeldt and de Luna (2001)
provide more information on the regime shift in New Zealand.
7Why Do Politicians Implement CBI-reforms?
Figures 2 and 3 show the frequencies of CBI-reform for OECD and non-
OECD countries. In the OECD countries, CBI-reforms started in 1989 (New
Zealand) and peaked in 1998, with reforms in nine European countries.
Most were prospective members of the ESCB (European System of Central
Banks), for whom the Maastricht Treaty required their central banks to
be independent before the ESCB￿ s establishment date. Other more recent
prospective members of the European Monetary Union (e.g., Czech Republic






















Figure 2: Number of central bank independence reforms in OECD countries.
Non-OECD countries (Figure 3) were the ￿rst to implement CBI-reforms,
with many in the early 1990s, mostly in South-America, peaking in 1995,
with ￿ve there, one in Asia, one in Africa and one in Europe. A second-wave
of non-OECD CBI-reforms started in 2002, mostly in Asia and Africa.
In the empirical study the reform year is indicated by one, when that
series was terminated, and all previous years are indicated with zeros. This
is done in order to avoid explaining the period after the CBI reform. Table






















Figure 3: Number of central bank independence reforms in non-OECD coun-
tries.
1 shows the frequency of CBI-reform and non-reform for the full, OECD,
and non-OECD samples.
We control for both economic characteristics, political factors, and geo-
graphical determinants in the analysis.
Economic characteristics are the level and variability of in￿ ation, mea-
sured by the annualized percentage change in consumer prices, from IMF
Financial Statistics; unemployment rates, obtained from the International
Labor Organization (ILO); gross domestic product per capita (GDP) in US
dollars and the use of fund and credits from the International Monetary
Fund, both from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators; and to-
tal debt services (%)3, from the World Bank￿ s Global Development Finance.
In addition, the strength of the ￿nancial sector is measured by liquid li-
abilities as a percentage of GDP, using data from the World Bank (Beck
3The sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods,
or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt,and repayments (repur-
chases and charges) to the IMF, as a percentage of exports of goods services and income.
The variable is obtained from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al., 2009).
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et al., 1999).4 All the economic variables are lagged one period to avoid
endogeniety problems.5
Table 1: Frequencies of dependent variable for 132 countires, 1980-2005.
Full sample OECD Non-OECD
No CBI-reform in observation year 2719 554 2165
CBI-reform in observation year 89 26 63
Total 2808 580 2228
Political factors used in the analysis are political fragmentation in the
parliament and whether the country is a federation or not, both from Lundell
and Karvonen￿ s (2003) Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions6, and
the number of coups in previous periods from the Coup Data Codebook
(Marshall and Marshall, 2007).
The simple use of implementation dates for CBI-reforms neglects the
degree of previous CBI. For example, CBI-reforms in some countries might
predate the study period. Therefore, the CBI-index developed by Cukier-
man et al. (1992) is used to analyze whether CBI-reform (or not) depends
on the initial level of CBI. Finally, geographical determinants used are the
number of CBI-reforms in the previous period in the same economic co-
operation organization: the European Union (EU), the African Economic
Community (AEC), the Asia-Paci￿c Economic Cooperation (APEC), or the
4Liquid liabilities include currency as well as demand and interest-bearing accounts of
banks and other ￿nancial intermediaries.
5We also tried lagging all the economic variables two or three periods, but all qualitative
results remained the same. The results are available from the authors upon request.
6The purpose of the data set is to gather information on political institutions around
the world since 1960. The data is compiled at the Department of Political Science, ¯bo
Akademi, in collaboration with Professor Torsten Persson at the Institute of International
Economic Studies, Stockholm University.
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Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).
Table 2: Number of missing observations for independent variables, 1980-2005.
Full sample OECD Non-OECD
Missing % Missing % Missing %
In￿ ation 331 12% 14 2% 317 14%
GDP per capita 387 14% 33 6% 354 16%
Unemployment 1608 57% 99 17% 1509 68%
Liquid assets 962 34% 261 45% 701 31%
Total debt 1302 46% 519 89% 783 35%
Use of funds and credits 283 10% 0 0% 283 13%
Political fragmentation 1121 40% 50 9% 1071 48%
Federation 1154 41% 0 0% 1154 52%
Coups 1000 36% 43 7% 957 43%
A problem when working with macro-data for the many countries consid-
ered here is missing data. Table 2 shows the number of missing observations
in the full, OECD, and non-OECD samples. The problem is largest for the
non-OECD sample, especially for unemployment, political fragmentation,
federation, and the presence of coups. For the OECD sample the prob-
lem is largest for liquid assets and total debt, and for the full sample for
unemployment and total debt.
Since missing data (if not random) can obscure the results, multiple
imputation (see e.g., Graham et al., 2003) is used as replacement method.
Multiple imputation has been shown to produce unbiased parameter esti-
mates which re￿ ect the uncertainty associated with the missing observations.
The method has further been shown to provide adequate results in presence
of high rates of missing data (Schafer and Graham, 2002). An iterative
Markov chain Monte Carlo method is used to impute missing observations
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and 5 data sets are created. The empirical analysis is then performed on
each of the data sets and the estimation results for each are later combined,
using the rules established by Rubin (1987), to produce one set of estimation
results. The means and standard deviations for all variables (with imputed
values) averaged over the 5 data sets are shown in Table 3. The variables
are further discussed in the next section.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, 1980-2005
Full sample OECD Non-OECD
Variable Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
In￿ ation 25.91 73.84 12.32 33.20 29.44 80.77
GDP per capita 6465 8188 17310 9275 3642 4851
Unemployment 8.27 4.84 7.24 4.26 8.54 4.95
Liquid assets 0.47 0.31 0.60 0.35 0.43 0.29
Total debt 18.83 13.86 21.09 12.42 18.24 14.14
Pol fragmentation 5591 2176 5316 2256 6651 1399
Federation 0.21 0.32 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.23
Coups 0.25 0.57 0.10 0.36 0.29 0.61
CBI index 35.39 8.19 36.92 15.11 34.99 4.95
Number CBI-reforms 0.18 0.62 0.25 0.80 0.16 0.56
Number of obs. 2808 580 2228
Number of countries 132 30 102
4 Empirical model
To investigate why politicians choose to implement CBI-reforms, we de￿ne
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where Xit and Zit are vectors of economic and political variables, respec-
tively, assumed to a⁄ect reform pressure, while ￿0
j and ￿0
k are the corre-
sponding parameter vectors. The error term is speci￿ed as "it = ￿i + ￿it,
where ￿i denotes country speci￿c unobservable e⁄ects and ￿it is a random
error. In the speci￿cation of a probit random-e⁄ects model, as here, it is
assumed that ￿it ￿ IN(0;￿2
￿).7 Reform pressure can only be observed in






it ￿ 0 (if reform)
0; y￿
it < 0 (if no reform)
The parameters of the model are estimated by noting that the distribution
of y￿
it conditional on ￿i is independent normal (Heckman, 1981). Thus













and ￿ is the distribution function for a standard normal variate.
Domestic in￿ ation is included in the vector of economic explanatory
variables, Xit, to study whether CBI-reforms are more likely in countries
with high in￿ ation (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983;
Rogo⁄, 1985), in which case we expect a positive e⁄ect; or in countries that
have already achieved low in￿ ation (Cukierman, 1994), in which case we
7Fixed and random-e⁄ects Logit models, as well as linear probability models with
random e⁄ects, gave similar results.
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expect a negative e⁄ect.
In addition to the level of previous in￿ ation, a history of high in￿ ation
variability might lead to an anti-in￿ ation culture that induces the politicians
to implement CBI-reforms (Hayo, 1998). To account for historical volatility
in in￿ ation in country i, without loosing too many observations, the histori-




Inflationij￿1)2. Thus, the number of observations used in the calculation
of the mean in￿ ation, Inflationij￿1, and the variance, ￿2
it, increases for
each successive observation, i.e. ￿2
i;1985 is based on the observations from
1980-1984 while ￿2
i;1990 is based on the observations from 1980-1989.
Unemployment is included to study whether a high natural rate of un-
employment makes surprise in￿ ation more bene￿cial and thereby reduces
the likelihood of a CBI-reform, or whether it instead strengthens the need
for a CBI-reform.8
Total debt services and the use of funds and credits from the IMF are use
to study whether countries with high debt-ratio might be "forced" to imple-
ment CBI-reforms in order to signal creditworthiness to foreign investors.
Political instability is assumed to reduce the probability of CBI-reform,
and is therefore proxied with an exponential weighted moving average (EWMA,
20 years) of the number of coups in the country. The weights for succes-
sive past observations in the moving average were calculated as (1 ￿ ￿)￿0,
(1 ￿ ￿)￿1;(1 ￿ ￿)￿2;:::; where ￿ is 0.75.9
Political fragmentation, measured by Rae￿ s index of party fractionaliza-
8Actual unemployment tends to follow the natural rate of unemployment (Elmeskov,
1994) and is, therefore, used as a proxy.
9The values ￿ = 0:94, and ￿ = 0:5 gave similar results.
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tion in the parliament, is also included in the vector of political variables,
Zit, to study whether more fragmented countries are more likely to imple-
ment CBI-reform. A value of zero would indicate that one party had all seats
in parliament, whereas a value of 10,000 would indicate that each party had
only one seat.
Federation, a dummy variable taking the values one or zero, is included
to study whether countries practicing ￿scal federalism are more likely to im-
plement CBI-reform. Liquid assets, a proxy for the strength of the ￿nancial
sector, is included to study whether countries with a strong ￿nancial sector
are more likely to implement CBI-reform. The CBI-index, a measure of pre-
existing CBI, is included to study whether countries with high independence
were less likely to implement further CBI-reform.
Finally, in order to control for geographical e⁄ects, the number of CBI-
reforms in period t ￿ 1 in the same economic cooperation organization was
included.
5 Results
The combined estimation results (combined over the 5 imputed data sets)
for the random-e⁄ects probit models are displayed in Table 4. In the full
sample, countries with a historically high in￿ ation variability and a high
degree of political fragmentation in the parliament were more likely than
others to implement CBI-reforms, at 5% levels of signi￿cance. However,
when the sample was divided into OECD and non-OECD countries, these
results seem driven by the later group of countries.
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The results indicate that politicians in non-OECD countries implement
CBI-reforms when their country has a history of high variable in￿ ation. This
supports Hayo￿ s (1998) claim that CBI is related to an historical feedback
process, suggesting that CBI-reforms are implemented because a high his-
torical in￿ ation variability creates stronger preferences for lower in￿ ation.
No such e⁄ect was present for OECD-countries. This might indicate that
the credibility of a low in￿ ation goal can be achieved without CBI-reforms
in more industrialized countries, thereby reducing the need for a CBI-reform
to achieve stable in￿ ation.
Contrary to prevailing theories of the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on CBI-reforms,
the estimated in￿ ation level parameter is not statistically signi￿cant for any
of the samples.10 In fact, no other economic variable is statistically signi￿-
cant at any conventional signi￿cance level for the full sample. Note, however,
that CBI-reforms might be implemented when in￿ ation is high in order to
achieve price stability or when in￿ ation is low to maintain price stability.
The likelihood of implementing a CBI-reforms can thus be in￿ uenced by
both hypotheses, thereby canceling out any signi￿cant e⁄ects of in￿ ation on
the decision to implement CBI-reforms.
Highly political fragmented non-OECD countries (but not OECD coun-
tries) were more likely to implement CBI-reforms, perhaps by politicians
afraid that they will be replaced, and eager to tie the hands of incoming
governments. The frequency of coups did not seem to in￿ uence the oc-
currence of CBI-reforms. However, the number of CBI-reforms in the same
10Di⁄erent lag structures for the in￿ ation variable (2 to 5 periods) were also tested, but
rendered insigni￿cant results.
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economic cooperation organization in the previous period seemed to increase
the likelihood of reform, generating geographical clustering in time.
A likelihood ratio test for the models, estimated on each of the samples,
was used to assess overall performance (against a constant only speci￿ca-
tion). The LR-statistics (with 12 d.f.) averaged over the 5 imputed samples
were 37.20, 15.19 and 27.95 for the full, OECD, and non-OECD samples,
respectively, indicating that the estimated models are signi￿cant at conven-
tional levels for the full sample and the non-OECD sample. Analysis of
the generalized residuals (based on Gourieroux et al., 1987) for each model
showed no residual autocorrelation. The total variance of the point estimates
is composed of two components; the natural variability in the data (the
within-imputation variability) and the uncertainty introduced by missing
data (the between-imputation variability). The second component re￿ ects
how the point estimates vary between the 5 imputed samples. On average
the missing data contributed to the total variance of the point estimates
with 14, 8, and 17 percent for the full, OECD, and non-OECD samples. Ta-
ble 4 reports the contribution to the total variance for the point estimates
due to missing data for each of the variables.
6 Summary and conclusions
It is something of a puzzle that politicians in many countries have recently
implemented CBI-reforms, thereby reducing their ability to ￿ne-tune the
economy. This paper is a ￿rst empirical attempt to investigate why they
would do so.
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The lack of compiled data on the occurrence of CBI-reforms is probably
why no previous study has investigated this question. Therefore, we col-
lected and analyzed data on the possible occurrence of CBI-reform during
1980-2005 in 132 countries, 89 of which (67%) had implemented such a re-
form. Hence, CBI-reform seems to be a major recent trend, illustrating the
in￿ uence of the time-inconsistency literature on policy outcomes around the
world.
To investigate why politicians implement CBI-reforms, a random-e⁄ects
probit regression model was estimated. It was found that politicians in non-
OECD countries were more likely to formally grant their central bank greater
independence if their country had a history of high in￿ ation variability.
This might indicate that politicians aversion against in￿ ation have increased
during the periods of high in￿ ation variability and that CBI-reforms are
implemented as a consequence of changed preferences. No such e⁄ect was
found for OECD-countries, implying that they might be able to establish
credibility for a price stability rule with other means.
It was also found that politically fragmented non-OECD countries were
more likely to implement CBI-reforms. This could indicate that the fear of
losing power induced politicians to delegate power to independent central
banks.
Finally, the likelihood of CBI-reform increased if other countries in the
same economic cooperation organization had recently implemented such re-
form.
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Armenia Malawi Sªo TomØ and Pr￿ncipe
Congo Mauritania Saudi Arabia
Eritrea Moldova Senegal
Guinea Morocco Sierra Leone
Haiti Mozambique Taiwan
Hong Kong Myanmar Tajikistan
Kyrgyz Republic Netherlands Antilles Tonga
Lebanon Panama United Arab EmiratesTable A2: Year and sources of CBI-reform in 132 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
Afganisthan 2003 Law Da Afganisthan Bank (www.centralbank.gov.af),
and e-mail correspondence
Albania 1998 Constitution of the Republic of Albania (Article 161),
(www.bankofalbania.org)
Argentina 1992 BCAR￿ s chapter reform, law 24.144 (www.bcar.gov.ar),
and e-mail correspondence
Australia 1996 Statement on the conduct of monetary policy (www.rba.gov.au),
Polillo and Gillen (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2008),
Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008), and e-mail correspondence
Austria 1998 Nationalbankgesetz-Federal Law Gazette Part I No.161/2004
(www.oenb.at), and e-mail correspondence.
Azerbaijan 2004 Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the National Bank of the
Republic of Azerbaijan (www.nba.az)
Bahamas 2000 Central Bank Act of the Bahamas 2000
(www.centralbankbahamas.com), and e-mail correspondence
Bahrain None e-mail correspondence
Bangladesh None www.bangladesh-bank.org
Barbados None www.centralbank.org.bb
Belarus None www.nbrb.by, and e-mail correspondence
Belgium 1999 Polillo and Gillen (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2008), and
Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008)
Belize None www.centralbank.org.bz
Bhutan None www.rma.org.btTable A2 (Cont): Year and sources of possible CBI-reform in 132 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
Bolivia 1995 JÆcome and Vazques (2005)
Bosnia 1997 Dvorsky (2004), cbbh.ba, and e-mail correspondence
Botswana None Bank of Botswana Act (www.bankofbotswana.bw)
Brazil None Ribeiro (2002)
Brunei None www.￿nance.gov.bn/bcb/bcb_index.htm, and e-mail correspondence.
Bulgaria 2005 Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (www.bnb.bg), and
e-mail correspondence
Burundi None e-mail correspondence
Cambodia None www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2004/071504.htm
Canada None www.bankofcanada.ca/en/about/act_loi_boc_bdc.pdf, and
e-mail correspondence
Cap Verde None www.bcv.cv
Cent. Af. States None www.beac.int
Chad None www.beac.int
Chile 1989 www.bcentral.cl/eng/funorg/organiclaw/, JÆcome and Vazques (2005),
and e-mail correspondence
China None Law of the People·s Bank of China (www.pbc.gov.cn/english)
Colombia 1992 www.banrep.gov.co/board_directors/bd_mission.htm,
JÆcome and Vazques (2005), and e-mail correspondence
Comoros None www.bancecom.com/bcc_home.php
Costa Rica 1995 Law No. 7558, Act of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (www.bccr.￿.cr),
e-mail correspondence, and JÆcome and Vazques (2005)
Croatia 2001 Dvorsky (2004), Law of the Croatian National Bank (www.hnb.hr), and
e-mail correspondenceTable A2 (Cont): Year and sources of possible CBI-reform in 132 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
Cyprus 2002 Central Bank of Cyprus Law L138(I)/2002 (www.mof.gov.cy),
and e-mail correspondence
Czech Republic 1993 Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Decision
No. 278/2001 (www.cnb.cz), and e-mail correspondence
Denmark None www.nationalbanken.dk, and e-mail correspondence
Djibouti 2005 e-mail correspondence
Dominican Rep 2002 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Ecuador 1992 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Egypt None www.cbe.org.eg
El Salvador 1991 Organic Law of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador
www.bcr.gob.sv/ingles/acerca/resenia.html), e-mail
correspondence, and JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Estonia 2004 Eesti Pank Act (www.legaltext.ee/text/en/X70022.htm), and e-mail
correspondence
Ethiopia None www.nbe.gov.et
Fiji None www.reservebank.gov.fj, and e-mail correspondence
Finland 1998 The Act on the Bank of Finland (www.bof.￿), and e-mail correspondence
France 1993 www.banque-france.fr/gb/instit/histoire/histor5.htm, and e-mail
correspondence
Gambia 2005 www.cbg.gm/pdf/strategic%20plan.pdf
Georgia 1995 Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia
(www.nbg.gov.ge/nbg_new/about_the_bank/nbg_history.htm)
Germany None www.bundesbank.de, and e-mail correspondence
Ghana None www.bog.gov.gh/privatecontent/File/Secretarys/bog-act.pdfTable A2 (Cont): Year and sources of possible CBI-reform in 132 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
Greece 1994 Law 2275, Articles 45 and 46 (www.bankofgreece.gr/en), Max￿eld (1997),
Panagioditis and Triampella (2006), and Acemoglu et al. (2008)
Guatemala 2002 Principales Leyes Bancarias y Financieras
(www.banguat.gob.gt), and e-mail correspondence
Guyana 1998 The Bank of Guyana Act (www.bankofguyana.org.gy/legalregframewk.htm),
and JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Honduras 1996 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Hungary 1991 Act of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (english.mnb.hu)
Iceland 2001 www.sedlabanki.is, and e-mail correspondence
India None Polillo and Guillen (2005), and Acemoglu et al. (2008)
Indonesia 1999 Central Bank Act, UU No. 23, 1999 (www.bi.go.id),
Polillo and Guillen (2005), and Acemoglu et al. (2008)
Iran 2005 www.cbi.ir/default_en.aspx
Ireland 1998 Central Bank Act 1998 and convergence report
(www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/conrep/cr1998en.pdf)
Israel None e-mail correspondence
Italy 1993 Legislative Decree 385, 1993 (www.bancaditalia.it),
Polillo and Guillen (2005), and Acemoglu et al. (2008)
Jamaica None www.boj.org.jm/uploads/pdf/qmp_report/fqmp_report_october_
december2003.pd, and Nelson-Fouglas (2004)
Japan 1998 www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/about/foboj.htm, and Werner (2003: ch 18)
Jordan None www.cbj.gov.jo/pages.php
Kazakhstan 2005 www.nationalbank.kz/cont/publish626681_1720.doc, and
e-mail correspondenceTable A2 (Cont): Year and sources of possible CBI-reform in 132 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
Kenya None e-mail correspondence
Korea 1997 Polillo and Guillen (2005), and Acemoglu et al. (2008)
Kuwait None www.cbk.gov.kw/WWW/index.html
Lao None www.bol.gov.la/bollaw1.html, and e-mail correspondence
Latvia 2002 www.bank.lv/eng/main/lvbank/llb/), convergence report
(www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/conrep/cr2004en.pdf), and
e-mail correspondence
Lesotho 2000 www.centralbank.org.ls/about/default.htm), and
e-mail correspondence
Lithuania 2001 Morgan Stanley (2004)
Luxemburg 1998 www.bcl.lu/en/bcl/index.html
Macedonia 2002 Dvorsky (2004)
Madagascar 1994 e-mail correspondence
Malaysia 1994 Arnone et al. (2007)
Maldives None e-mail correspondence
Malta 2002 www.centralbankmalta.com/site/about4a.html), and
e-mail correspondence
Mauritius 2004 e-mail correspondence
Mexico 1994 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005), and e-mail correspondence
Mongolia 1995 Slok (2002), and Polillo and Guillen (2005)
Namibia 2004 e-mail correspondence
Nepal 2002 www.nrb.org.np/index.htm, and e-mail correspondence
Netherlands 1998 www.dnb.nl/dnb/home/￿le/bankact1998_tcm13-36143.pdf,
and e-mail correspondenceTable A2 (Cont): Year and sources of possible CBI-reform in 132 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
New Zealand 1989 Evans et al. (1996), Silverstone et al. (1996),
Daunfeldt and de Luna (2001), and e-mail correspondence
Nicaragua 1992 www.bcn.gob.ni/english/about/origin_bank.htm, and
JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Nigeria 1999 e-mail correspondence
Norway 2003 www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/OTP/20022003/081/PDFS/
OTP200220030081000DDDPDFS.pdf), and e-mail correspondence
Oman None www.cbo-oman.org/BankingLaw/BankingLaw.pdf
Pakistan 1997 Morgan Stanley (2004)
New Guinea 2000 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2000/cr00137.pdf), and
e-mail correspondence
Paraguay 1995 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)




Portugal 1998 www.bportugal.pt/default_e.htm, ECB (1998), and
e-mail correspondence
Romania 2004 Dvorsky (2004), www.bnro.ro/def_en.htm, and e-mail correspondence
Russia 1995 www.cbr.ru/eng/today/history/central_bank.asp
Samoa None e-mail correspondence
Serbia 2003 Dvorsky (2004)
Seychelles 2004 www.cbs.sc/acro/QuarterlyReviewQ22005.pdf, and
e-mail correspondenceTable A2 (Cont): Year and sources of possible CBI-reform in 133 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
Singapore None Polillo and Guillen (2005)
Slovak Rep 1993 www.nbs.sk/INDEXA.HTM, and e-mail correspondence
Slovenia 2002 ECB (2004)
Solomon Isl None www.cbsi.com.sb/CBSI%20ACT.pdf
South Africa 1996 www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV
/700A8754AC98C40242257037003CAB4C/$File/Factsheet1.pdf
Spain 1994 www.bde.es/normativa/be/leyautone.pdf, and e-mail correspondence.
Sri Lanka 2002 e-mail correspondence
Sudan None (http://www.bankofsudan.org/)
Suriname 2005 e-mail correspondence
Swaziland None (http://www.centralbank.org.sz/history.php)
Sweden 1999 www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=9173,
Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008), and e-mail correspondence.
Switzerland 2004 www.snb.ch/e/snb/index.html?￿le=recht/content_recht.html,
and e-mail correspondence





Trinidad None www.central-bank.org.tt/the_bank/1041.pdf), and e-mail
correspondence.
Tunisia None (http://www.bct.gov.tn/bct/siteprod/english/presentation/historique.jsp)Table A2 (Cont): Year and sources of possible CBI-reform in 133 countries, 1980-2005
Country Year Sources
Turkey 2001 www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/banka/law.html, and e-mail
correspondence
Turkmenistan None www.heritage.org/Index/country.cfm?id=Turkmenistan
Uganda 1993 e-mail correspondence
Ukraine 1999 Schw￿diauer et al (2006)
United Kingdom 1998 www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/legislation/legis.htm,
Morgan Stanley (2004), and e-mail correspondence
United States None e-mail correspondence
Uruguay 1995 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Uzbekistan 1995 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Vanuatu None e-mail correspondence
Venezuela 1992 JÆcome and VÆzquez (2005)
Vietnam 1997 e-mail correspondence
Yemen 2000 Central Bank Law No. 14 (www.buyusa.gov/yemen/en/yemen2008.pdf )
Zambia None e-mail correspondence
Zimbabwe None www.rbz.co.zw/about/about.aspReferences Table A2
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1 Introduction
In recent years many countries have implemented institutional reforms that
formally established the independence of central banks from elected policy-
makers (Daunfeldt et al., 2008). The reason for this might be that inde-
pendent central banks are widely believed to perform better at achieving
low in￿ ation than central banks controlled by politicians. The theoretical
background of this belief is the literature on time-inconsistency in monetery
policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogo⁄, 1985).
There is some empirical evidence that countries with independent central
banks have lower in￿ ation (Cukierman, 2008). For example, Cukierman et
al. (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993) found a negative correlation be-
tween average in￿ ation and the degree of central bank independence (CBI),
suggesting that in￿ ation might be reduced via CBI-reforms.
However, these studies used data from only a small set of mostly highly
industrialized countries. Cukierman et al (2002), on the other hand, studied
the relation between CBI and in￿ ation in 26 former socialist countries during
their transition to market economies, but found no correlation, at least in the
early stages of economic liberalization. Cukierman et al (1993) also found no
correlation between CBI and in￿ ation in up to 70 less-developed countries.
Thus the importance of CBI might di⁄er across countries at di⁄erent levels
of development. Therefore it might be helpful to increase the number of
countries under study.
In addition, previous studies have not addressed the question of endo-
geniety, since correlation analysis is not su¢ cient for establishing a causal
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relationship between variables. It might be that low in￿ ation leads to more
CBI, rather than the other way around. Or there might have been a vari-
able omitted from the models that caused both CBI and low in￿ ation, for
example social attitudes (Posen, 1993; Hayo, 1998). The construction of
CBI indices is also somewhat subjective, potentially leading to bias (Forder,
1996, 1998; Mangano, 1998).1
This paper thus studies whether countries that implemented CBI re-
forms performed better in terms of in￿ ation than those that did not, while
expanding the dataset and taking into account possible endogeniety and sub-
jectivity, during the study period, 1980-2005. Legal changes considered CBI
reforms are those reforms that formally decreased the in￿ uence of elected
politicians on monetary policy.
The focus is thus on changes in the legal independence of central banks,
instead on the level of CBI. As all the reforms increased CBI, the subjectivity
that plagues most commonly used CBI indices (Daunfeldt and de Luna,
2008) is reduced. However, focusing on changes rather than level does not
totally eliminate bias as there is still some subjectivity in interpreting what
constitutes a change. For example, it might be argued that a change was
too small to be considered a real change, or that it was in a dimension not
relevant for CBI. However, small changes are usually amendments of earlier
larger changes, usually involving multiple dimensions, including CBI.2
1For example, one country might be ranked higher than another according to one
criterion for CBI, but lower according to another criterion. Clearly, how the two countries
are ranked according to an aggregate CBI index depends on the weights given to the two
criteria. It follows that di⁄erent CBI indices might rank the countries di⁄erently.
2Basically, a CBI index should be monoton and continuous in the mapping from the
relevant dimensions, but it does not have meaningful cardinal interpretation. See also
previous footnote.
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The analysis is based on a novel dataset compiled by Daunfeldt et al.
(2008), covering the possible occurence of CBI reforms in 132 countries dur-
ing the period 1980-2005. This means that the study includes more countries
than any previous study on CBI and in￿ ation.
The study, closely related to one by Ball and Sheridan (2005), is based
on a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence method, previously also used to identify the
e⁄ect of a change in institutional (e.g., legal) factors (Meyer, 1995). Ball
and Sheridan (2005) used it to study whether in￿ ation-targeting reduced
in￿ ation in 20 OECD countries, ￿nding that it did, but not when regression
to the mean was controlled for. Instead of comparing targeters and non-
targeters, countries that implemented CBI reforms during the study period
are here compared to those that did not. Following Ball and Sheridan (2005),
regression to the mean, the tendency of large (or small) measures to be
followed by measures closer to the average3, since transitory factors tend to
disappear over the long run, was controlled for by including in￿ ation in the
￿rst year in the dataset as an explanatory variable.
In an alternative analysis, to study whether the e¢ ciency of CBI reform
depended on previous in￿ ation rates, countries were included or excluded,
depending on their level of pre-reform in￿ ation. The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
method eliminates endogeneity due to unobservable time-invariant country-
speci￿c e⁄ects connected to the level of in￿ ation. Since di⁄erences are used,
these e⁄ects are cancelled out, as are any time-variant symmetric e⁄ects.
3A well-known example of this is that athletes who have been extremely successful in
their rookie year in team sports, often ￿nd it almost impossible to live up to expectations
during their sophomore year. More generally, an athlete￿ s superior performance is likely
to be followed by poorer performance, due to regression alone (Gilovich, 1991).
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Countries that implemented CBI reforms during the study period are
found to have reduced in￿ ation more than those that did not, though no
such e⁄ect was found for countries with previous low in￿ ation. The results
thus seems to be driven by countries that had high pre-reform in￿ ation,
perhaps suggesting that the e¢ ciency of CBI reform is related to recent
in￿ ation experience.
The next section presents the data and sample of countries, while sec-
tion 3 presents and discusses the empirical method. Section 4 presents and
discusses the results. Section 5 summarizes and draws conclusions.
2 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 The data
To investigate whether countries with CBI reforms perform better than oth-
ers, dates of implementation are needed. This information is available in
the dataset obtained and previously used by Daunfeldt et al. (2008).
The dates of CBI reforms were obtained by contacting, by e-mail, all cen-
tral banks listed in Morgan Stanley￿ s Central Bank Directory 2004, asking
the following questions: (i) Has your country implemented any institutional
reforms that grant your central bank more independence from elected poli-
cymakers? (ii) If yes, when? (iii) Where can we ￿nd more information about
this?
This method of obtaining information was convenient, and had the added
bene￿t of treating all the countries equally, at least initially, without regard
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to whether or not their central bank has posted information on a website.
Of the 162 central banks contacted, 95 (59%) answered the questionnaire.
For the banks that did not, the dates of any CBI reforms were obtained from
central bank acts, central bank publications, and scienti￿c articles. These
sources were also used to validate the answers obtained by e-mail.
Of interest here are reforms that established CBI in dimensions possibly
relevant for in￿ ation-bias in monetary policy, due to time-inconsistency, by
naming the low in￿ ation goal in the legislation; reducing the possibility for
the government to override central bank decisions; restricting governments￿
opportunities to use central bank credits to ￿nance budget de￿cits; reducing
the power to dismiss central bank governors; increasing their terms in o¢ ce
and number; and so on. But, besides a clear change towards more CBI, the
magnitude of change is undetermined.
The dataset consists of a panel of 132 countries over 1980-2005 (81%
of the countries that were initially contacted by e-mail), of which 89 had
implemented CBI reforms during the period. The dates, as well as countries
with no information on CBI reform, are presented in Daunfeldt et al. (2008),
Table A1 and A2. In￿ ation data is missing for four countries, Afganisthan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Slovak Republic, reducing the panel
to 128 countries.
The countries in the dataset are classi￿ed as either reform- or non-reform
countries. For countries that implemented CBI reforms, time is partitioned
into pre-reform period and a post-reform periods, with the break de￿ned
as beginning of the year when the reform was implemented. To use the
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence method, a break-point between pre-reform and post-
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reform periods also needs to be de￿ned for the countries that did not im-
plement any CBI reforms. Following Ball and Sheridan (2005), it is de￿ned
as the unweighted average of the reform years of the reform countries. This
year is 1998, which is also the median year for reform.4 Next, average in￿ a-
tion was calculated for both the pre-reform and post-reform periods, for all
the countries in the sample, using in￿ ation measures from IMF Financial
Statistics.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
The time series for median and mean in￿ ation for reform and non-reform
countries from 1980 to 2005 are presented in Figure 1 and 2, respectively. For
both reform and non-reform countries, mean in￿ ation rates were much lower
during the end of the study period, as were also the median rates. Only eight
countries experienced higher in￿ ation in the post-reform period. The mean
in￿ ation rates are somewhat lower for reform countries in the post-period,
compared to non-reform countries, although it was higher in the pre-reform
period, giving the impression that CBI-reforms are important for improving
in￿ ation performance. Although the vertical scales are di⁄erent on the two
￿gures, the strikingly di⁄erent patterns of mean and median in￿ ation rates,
may indicate problems with extreme values in the dataset, which might
distort the results.
4A sensitivity analysis was performed using di⁄erent years depending on which eco-
nomic cooperation area (e.g. EU) the countries belong to, as a break between pre- and
post-reform. These analyses did not generate qualitatively di⁄erent results.


















































































Figure 1: Median in￿ ation in reform and non-reform countries, 1980-2005












































































Figure 2: Mean in￿ ation in reform and non-reform countries, 1980-2005
Plotting the change in in￿ ation against the average level of in￿ ation in
the pre-reform period (Figure 3), makes regression to the mean e⁄ect clearly
visible, i.e., in￿ ation fell more in countries that experienced higher in￿ ation,
in the pre-reform period, with no clear di⁄erence between reform and non-
reform countries. The methods used for controlling for regression to the
mean are discussed in the next section.
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Figure 3: Change in in￿ ation (infdi⁄) against the level of average in￿ ation
in the pre-reform period (infpre_mean), of reform (1) and non-reform (0)
countries.
Figure 3 also shows the extreme observations that can distort the re-
sults. Therefore a boxplot analysis was performed on pre-reform in￿ ation to
exclude such outliers (Figure 4). A country was considered an outlier if the
pre-reform in￿ ation was more than two standard deviation above the mean,
or above 55.19%. This excluded a further 23 countries, leaving 105 in the
dataset.
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Figure 4: Boxplot of level of average in￿ ation in the pre-reform period
(infpre_mean).
Mean and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical
analysis are presented in Table 1. Note that the descriptive statistics sup-
ports the impression that CBI-reforms were important for reducing in￿ ation
performance. The variables are further explained in the next section.
3 Empirical Model
To investigate whether CBI reforms improved in￿ ation performance, we dis-
tinguish between reform and non-reform countries, with a dummy variable,
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations of variables
All Reform Non-Reform
Variable Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Pre-reform in￿ ation 13.79 12.30 15.86 13.53 9.98 8.61
Post-reform in￿ ation 7.75 16.44 6.95 6.73 9.29 26.79
In￿ ation reduction 6.07 17.93 8.98 11.80 0.75 24.98
Initial In￿ ation 58.4 237.2 78.7 289.7 18.7 30.1
CBI dummy 0.66 0.47
Number of countries 105 71 34
using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence, as noted. The following regression (Model





i = ￿0 + ￿1Di + ￿i (1)
where ￿
pre
i is average pre-reform in￿ ation in country i; ￿
post
i is its average
post-reform in￿ ation; Di is a dummy variable equal to one if country i
implemented CBI reform during the study period, otherwise zero; and ￿ is
an error-term. The parameter ￿1 then measures the impact of CBI reform
on in￿ ation. The hypothesis that CBI reform did not matter can be rejected
if the estimate of ￿1 (expected to be positive) is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero.
However, Model I might produce biased parameter estimates, since it
does not control for regression to the mean. High-in￿ ation countries, which
are likely to reduce their in￿ ation more than other countries regardless of
their monetary regime, might thus distort the results.
To control for this, Ball and Sheridan (2005) added average pre-reform
in￿ ation (￿
pre
i ) as an independent (as well as dependent) variable, thereby
perhaps causing endogeneity, i.e., that ￿
pre
i might be correlated with the
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error-term (Kennedy, 2003). To reduce this possible endogeniety country i￿ s
in￿ ation in the ￿rst year in the dataset, ￿0






i = ￿0 + ￿1Di + ￿2￿0
i + ￿i (2)
In this case the parameter for the CBI dummy (￿1) indicates whether
CBI reform a⁄ected in￿ ation, given ￿rst year in￿ ation.
First year in￿ ation (￿0
i) might be a poor proxy for regression to the
mean, however, since some countries might have been able to reduce initial
high in￿ ation already in the later years of the pre-period. To control for the
e⁄ect of regression to the mean in some other way, the sample was thus split
into low- and high-in￿ ation groups, according to a criteria explained below.
First, all countries were ranked according to pre-period in￿ ation, outliers
excluded. The di⁄erence between pre- and post-reform in￿ ation was then
regressed against the reform dummy, ￿rst for only the 25% with lowest pre-
reform in￿ ation, 5.6% or lower. Then a corresponding regression was run
for all other countries. Next, a regression was run for half the countries,
those with pre-reform in￿ ation lower than 9.8 %, and another regression for










iH = ￿0 + ￿1DiH + ￿i (3b)





iL is the in￿ ation di⁄erence between pre- and post-reform




iH is for high-in￿ ation coun-
tries.
The CBI dummy Di might itself also be endogenous, due to a time-
variant country-speci￿c e⁄ect. For example, the probability of a CBI reform
might increase with pre-reform in￿ ation (and thus with positive transitory
shocks), and thus be positively correlated with the error term. If the CBI
dummy is endogenous in this way, then we would expect estimators related
to it to be positively biased, attributing some of the reduction of in￿ ation
due to the passing of the transitory in￿ ation to the reform.5
4 Results
The aim of the empirical part of the paper was to investigate whether coun-
tries that have implemented CBI-reforms, that is countries in the dataset
with a dummy value of 1, have improved their of in￿ ation performance rela-
tive to those countries that have not implemented such institutional reforms.
The results from estimating equations (1)-(2) are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Determinants of in￿ ation performance, 1980-2005
Model I Model II
Variable (parameter) Est. t-value Est. t-value
Constant (￿0) 0.74 0.26 0.52 0.18
CBI dummy (￿1) 8.24 2.30 7.54 2.10
First-year in￿ ation (￿2) 0.01 1.60
5Angrist and Pischke (2009) discuss problems with using standard instrumental-
variable techniques when the instrumented variable is dichotomous. No instrument highly
correlated with the reform dummy was found.
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The null hypothesis that CBI reform did not matter for in￿ ation per-
formance can be rejected at all conventional signi￿cance levels in Model I.
In Model II, when ￿rst year in￿ ation is included to control for the possibil-
ity of regression to the mean, CBI reform was still statistically signi￿cant.
Reform countries thus improved in￿ ation performance on the average more
than non-reform countries, supporting the belief that CBI-reforms are help-
ful in achieving price stability.
Table 3: In￿ ation reduction, due to CBI reform, for di⁄erent partitions
of data, 1980-2005
Low-in￿ ation countries High-in￿ ation countries
In￿ ation break point Est. t-value n Est. t-value n
5.6% (25% of sample) -0.39 -0.85 27 11.17 2.34 78
9.8% (50% of sample) -0.91 -1.96 53 18.11 2.28 52
17.7% (75% of sample) -0.46 -0.58 80 48.00 2.78 25
The results from the estimations of equations 3a and 3b, for di⁄erent
partitions of the data, are presented in Table 3. For low-in￿ ation countries
CBI reforms seems to have had no or little in￿ uence on in￿ ation performance.
The only statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of CBI reform is actually negative
in one case, implying that countries that did not implement CBI reforms
reduced in￿ ation more than those that did. A possible explanation is that
the low-in￿ ation group includes many countries with stable political systems
that had already been able to achive low in￿ ation earlier by other means
(for a similar explanation, see Daunfeldt and de Luna, 2008). CBI reforms
were, with low in￿ ation already achieved, perhaps only adopted as part of a
package of reforms aimed at transition towards a market economy or towards
joining a political union. When all countries were included in the group,
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there was a positive signi￿cant correlation. The results then, seems to be
sensitive to which countries are included in the regression.
For the high-in￿ ation countries, the CBI dummy is positive and statis-
tically signi￿cant at the 10% level, for all regressions. Thus, CBI reforms
seems to have contributed to reducing in￿ ation in high in￿ ation countries,
beyond the reduction due to regression to the mean. A separate regres-
sion run for the high-in￿ ation countries excluded from the main analysis,
as outliers, produced no statistically signi￿cant results, perhaps due to high
variability of in￿ ation. It also may point towards a heterogenous e⁄ect of
CBI reforms, hump-shaped in pre-reform in￿ ation. To sum up, while CBI
reforms seems to matter for in￿ ation performance in general, it matters little
for countries that already have achieved low in￿ ation by other means.
5 Summary and Conclusions
One of the most important recent macroeconomic ￿ndings is the strong
negative correlation between average in￿ ation and the degree of central bank
independence (CBI) (see e.g., Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers,
1993), which suggest that in￿ ation might be brought down with CBI reform.
In recent years many countries have implemented such reforms. Using a
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence method (Ball and Sheridan, 2005), it was studied
here whether countries that implemented CBI reform performed better in
terms of in￿ ation than countries that did not. The empirical analysis was
based on a dataset covering the possible occurence of CBI reforms in 132
countries during 1980-2005.
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CBI reform was found to be positively related to in￿ ation performance,
meaning that countries that implemented CBI reform brought down in￿ ation
more than countries that did not.
Countries were then ranked according to the level of pre-reform in￿ ation,
and partitioned into quartiles. The di⁄erence in in￿ ation between the pre-
and post-reform periods was then regressed against the reform dummy for
the ￿rst quartile, as well as for the other three quartiles together; then for
the lower half and the upper half; ￿nally for the lower three quartiles as
well as the upper quartile. CBI reform seem to have been more e¢ cient
in reducing in￿ ation in countries with high previous in￿ ation, while the
e⁄ect was not statistically signi￿cant (or even negative) in countries with
low previous in￿ ation.
Thus, the popular view that CBI reform is important for improving a
country￿ s in￿ ation performance, is not fully supported. The e¢ cacy of CBI
reform seems instead to depend on past in￿ ation.
In low-in￿ ation countries it might be that politicians￿unemployment-
targets coincide with the natural rate of unemployment, eliminating any
need for CBI reform. In high in￿ ation countries, on the other hand, CBI
reform might be needed in order to achieve credibility for a low-in￿ ation
rule.
The results here raise the question whether there are perhaps other con-
ditions that, together with formal legal independence of the central bank,
are important for improving in￿ ation performance. For example, the e⁄ec-
tiveness of CBI reform might be in￿ uenced by the level of political stability
in the countries. Or, the choice of nominal in￿ ation target might matter,
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perhaps together with how transparent the responsibilities and actions of
the central bank are to the public. These questions might be fruitful for
future research.
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